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1 Introduction
In a series of recent papers (Cristea and Webber,
1997; Webber and Joshi, 1998; Webber et al.,
1999a; Webber et al., 1999b), we have argued for
starting the analysis of discourse in the same way as
one starts the analysis of a clause, looking at how its
syntax and semantics project from the lexicon. This
is complementary to the issue of discourse pragmat-
ics – how these small syntactic units of discourse are
used in achieving communicative intentions – and
to other discourse processes that provide additional
organisational overlays on these units.
Intuitively, these small units of discourse cor-
respond to multi-clause descriptions of entities, in-
cluding individuals, sets, eventualities, situations,
etc. These descriptions can involve both first-order
and higher-order predicate-argument relations and
modal operators, forming the content of communic-
ative intentions.
A key feature of our analysis is that semantic dis-
course relations are associated with both syntactic
structures and anaphoric links, and that the proper-
ties of the two are (not surprisingly) different. To-
gether, they allow more complex semantics to be
conveyed through simpler structure.
For English, we have given linguistic evidence
for our analysis in terms of (a) the similar be-
havior of intra-sentential clausal connectives (i.e.,
subordinate conjunctions) and inter-sentential con-
nectives (i.e., parallel structures cued by “Not only
. . . But also . . . ”, “On the one hand, . . . On the other
hand, . . . ”, etc.); (b) the similar behavior of “nom-
inal parataxis” in English (i.e., noun-noun modi-
fiers) and clausal parataxis; and (c) the ability of
the analysis to explain the presence of multiple dis-
course connectives in a clause.
In contrast with Rhetorical Structure Theory
(Mann and Thompson, 1988), what the current ap-
proach offers is a decoupling of discourse semantics
from discourse syntax, rather than what is essen-
tially a “semantic grammar” for discourse – i.e., one
that merges syntactic-semantic patterns into a single
description, with re-write rules such as
non-volitional cause :=
caused situation causing situation
 
causing situation caused situation.
We have attempted to show that decoupling dis-
course syntax (however simple it may be) from
discourse semantics allows one to better see
how lexico-syntactic elements project discourse se-
mantics, just as they project discourse syntax, and
how discourse semantic relations arise (or are real-
ised) through different means – in particular,
 through the structures and structure-building
operations of a lexicalised grammar such as
Lexicalised Tree-Adjoining Grammar (Joshi,
1987; Joshi and Vijay-Shanker, 1999);
 through particular lexical items, which we
call p-bearing, that convey a semantic relation
between the interpretation of the clause they
are structurally part of and a propositional in-
terpretation that is anaphorically presupposed
(Van der Sandt, 1992), just as the referent of
a pronoun or definite NP is anaphorically pre-
supposed.1
 through inference based on world knowledge,
usage conventions, etc., that makes defeasible
contributions to discourse interpretation that
go beyond the non-defeasible propositions oth-
erwise contributed.2
1Presupposition has been implicated in other aspects of dis-
course connective interpretation, such as causal connectives
presupposing defeasible causal rules (Knott, 1996; Lagerwerf,
1998), but we have not addressed these aspects in our work.
2Implicature also contributes to discourse interpretation,
but as we have not yet come across any cases where im-
plicature contributes additional semantic relations between
propositional/clausal interpretations, we have not yet paid it
much attention.
We only comment briefly in this paper on interac-
tions among these elements, since we feel that there
is still much that needs to be learned about them
from empirical and experimental studies. However,
our use of anaphoric presupposition in an account of
discourse relations suggests a unified account of dis-
course connectives, tense (whose anaphoric nature
has long been argued for – cf. Partee (1984) and
Webber (1988) inter alia), modality (which Stone
(1999) proposes to also treat anaphorically, par-
allel to tense), presuppositional determiners such
as “other”, “another”, “similar”, etc., and focus
particles such as “even” and “only”, which Stede
has suggested can sometimes be used to convey the
same meaning as a discourse connective, as in
(1) a. They laid waste to the park land.
b. Moreover, they began cutting down trees.
b’. They even began cutting down trees.
In this paper, we briefly set out our framework and
illustrate it through two minimal pairs of examples
that bring out its major features. We conclude with a
suggested program of future work. The presentation
draws heavily on (Webber et al., 1999b).
2 Framework
The approach uses the elementary trees of a Lexic-
alised Tree-Adjoining Grammar (LTAG) and LTAG
operations (adjoining and substitution) to associ-
ate structure and semantics with a sequence of dis-
course clauses.
In a lexicalized TAG, each elementary tree has at
least one anchor. In the case of discourse, the an-
chor for an elementary tree may be a lexical item,
punctuation or a feature structure that is lexically
null. The semantic contribution of a lexical anchor
includes both what it presupposes and what it as-
serts (Stone and Doran, 1997; Stone, 1998; Stone
and Webber, 1998). A feature structure anchor will
either unify with a lexical item with compatible fea-
tures (Knott and Mellish, 1996), yielding the previ-
ous case, or have an empty realisation, though one
that maintains its semantic features.
The initial elementary trees used here corres-
pond, by and large, to second-order predicate-
argument structures – i.e., usually binary predicates
on propositions or eventualities – while the auxil-
iary elementary trees provide further information
(constraints) added through adjoining.
Importantly, we bar crossed structural depend-
encies: the branches of trees cannot cross. To see
this, consider the parallel constructions anchored by
feature-structures realisable as “On the one hand
. . . On the other hand . . . ” and “Not only . . . But
also . . . ” (Webber and Joshi, 1998; Webber et al.,
1999a). The arguments to these constructions can-
not cross, as the following example shows:
(2) a. On the one hand, John likes beans.
b. Not only does he eat them for dinner.
c. On the other hand, he’s allergic to them.
d. But he also eats them for breakfast.
Here, the “not only” construction begun in
clause 2(b) seems incomplete, while clause 2(d)
seems more easily interpreted with respect to clause
(c) than the clause it is intended to complement –
clause (b).
Thus one diagnostic for taking the argument to a
predicate to be anaphoric rather than structural is
whether it can derive from across a structural link.
To see this, consider “then”, which we take to be
a p-bearing adverb that asserts that one eventuality
(β) starts after the culmination of another (α), and
that has only β (i.e., the interpretation of the clause
it is adjoined to) coming structurally. The other ar-
gument is presupposed and thus can derived from
an interpretation across a structural boundary, as in
(3) a. On the one hand, John loves Barolo.
b. So he ordered three cases of the ’97.
c. On the other hand, he had to cancel the order
d. because he then found that he was broke.
Here, the event that “then” asserts the “finding”
event in (d) to follow is the ordering event in (b).
This requires crossing the structural link in the par-
allel construction, confirming that this argument
comes non-structurally through anaphoric presup-
position.3
3 Examples
Now we illustrate briefly, using a pair of minimal
pairs, how short discourses built from LTAG con-
stituents get their semantics. The first pair (4a–
4b) illustrates how minimally different texts get
(approximately) the same interpretation, while the
second pair (4c–4d) shows how the p-bearing ele-
ment “for example” adds to the interpretation of
both. For more detail, see (Webber and Joshi, 1998;
3The fact that the events deriving from (b) and (d) appear
to have the same temporal relation in the absence of “then”
just shows that tense is indeed anaphoric and has no trouble
crossing structural boundaries either.
Webber et al., 1999a). For more information on
compositional semantic operations on LTAG deriv-
ation trees, see (Joshi and Vijay-Shanker, 1999).
(4) a. You shouldn’t trust John because he never
returns what he borrows.
b. You shouldn’t trust John. He never returns
what he borrows.
c. You shouldn’t trust John because, for ex-
ample, he never returns what he borrows.
d. You shouldn’t trust John. For example, he
never returns what he borrows.
Here A will stand for the LTAG parse tree for “you
shouldn’t trust John” and α, its derivation tree. Sim-
ilarly, B will stand for the LTAG parse tree for “he
never returns what he borrows” and β, its derivation
tree.
Example 4a involves an initial tree (γ) anchored
by “because” (Figure 1). Its derived tree comes
from A substituting at the left-hand substitution site
of γ (index 1) and B at the right-hand substitution
site (index 3). By virtue of the semantics of γ, the
interpretation of the derived tree is that the situ-
ation associated with the argument indexed 3 (the
interpretation of B) is the cause of that associated
with the argument indexed 1 (the interpretation of
A). (A more precise interpretation would distin-
guish between the direct and epistemic causality
senses of “because”, but the derivation would pro-
ceed in the same way. Following Lagerwerf (1998)
and others, one might also say that γ carries the pre-
supposition that the interpretation of the derived tree
follows from a more general defeasible rule. But as
this does not add to discourse connectivity, we have
ignored this type of presupposition in our work.)
Example 4b employs an auxiliary tree (γ)
anchored by “.” (Figure 2). Its derived tree comes
from B substituting at the right-hand substitution
site (index 3) of γ, and γ adjoining at the root of
A (index 0). Semantically, adjoining B to A via γ
simply implies that B continues the description of
the situation associated with A. The general infer-
ence that this stimulates leads to a defeasible con-
tribution of causality between them, which can be
denied without a contradiction – e.g.
(5) You shouldn’t trust John. He never returns
what he borrows. But that’s not why you
shouldn’t trust him.
The second minimal pair of examples focusses
on what an auxiliary tree anchored by the p-bearing
element “for example” (δ) adds to the clauses in the
first minimal pair. In Example 4c, δ adjoins at the
root of B (Figure 3). Like “then”, it contributes both
a presupposition and an assertion: “for example”
presupposes a shared set of eventualities, and as-
serts that the eventuality associated with the clause
it adjoins to, is a member of that set. (For more de-
tail, see (Webber et al., 1999b).) In Example 4c,
the set does not come from the interpretation of A
alone. Rather, it comes from a combination of A
and “because” – that is, the set of causes/reasons
for the situation associated with A. Thus, associated
with the derivation of (4c) are the assertions that the
situation associated with B is a cause for that asso-
ciated with A and that the situation associated with
B is one of a set of such causes.
Finally, Example 4d adds δ to the elements used
in Example 4b. As in Example 4b, the causal
relation between the interpretations of B and A
comes defeasibly from general inference. Of in-
terest though is what licences the presupposition of
“for example” – i.e., the set of eventualities that the
interpretation of B is asserted to be a member of.
Again, it does not come from A alone. Rather it
comes from A and the defeasible causal relation that
is inferred to hold – i.e., the set of causes/reasons
for A. For this to be the case, the defeasible causal
relation must be available as part of the interpret-
ation when the presupposition of “for example” is
resolved. Thus the relation between defeasible in-
ference and anaphoric presupposition, including the
time course of the reasoning involved, seems worthy
of further study.
4 Related Work
Recently, Asher and Lascarides (1999) have de-
scribed a version of SDRT that incorporates the se-
mantic contributions of both presuppositions and as-
sertions. In this enriched version of SDRT, a pro-
position can be linked to the previous discourse via
multiple rhetorical relations such as background and
defeasible consequence, which may be inferred, ex-
plicitly asserted or presupposed. Despite this simil-
arity with our approach, the two differ in significant
ways:
 The current approach focusses on the relation-
ship between discourse syntax and discourse
semantics, and glosses over the mechanisms
that are Asher and Lascarides’ primary con-
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cern, which involve the particular inferences
that listeners draw. Our focus is on syntax, the
ways in which discourse semantics resembles
clausal semantics, and the way in which dis-
course syntax both facilitates and constrains
discourse semantics.
 Asher and Lascarides take all connections (of
both asserted and presupposed material) to be
structural attachments through rhetorical rela-
tions to an evolving SDRT structure. The rhet-
orical relation may be inherent in the p-bearing
element (as with “also”) or it may have to be
inferred. The current approach does not make
such demands: anaphoric links are not struc-
tural, and rhetorical relations (as some fixed
set of predicates such as background, narrat-
ive etc.) do not drive the process. In the case
of p-bearing elements, what drives the process
is the need to ground the presupposed argu-
ment of whatever particular semantic relation
the given p-bearing element conveys.
 Asher and Lascarides specify particular pref-
erences on attachment sites (of either asser-
ted or presupposed material), as well as con-
straints on attachment sites associated with the
type of rhetorical relation involved. In the
current approach, a structural connection can
only be made if it doesn’t lead to a cross-
ing dependency, which essentially means a
“right frontier” constraint on structural links.
However, with presupposed arguments to p-
bearing elements (as the case with pronominal
and definite NP anaphora), we do not believe
that enough is known yet about what proposi-
tions/eventualities a listener is attending to and
how propositions/eventualities interfere with
one another with respect to listener attention.
So we have refrained from defining constraints
and preferences on attachment sites until em-
pirical studies provide relevant data.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have summarised arguments we
have presented elsewhere for a level of discourse
structure and semantics that uses all and only the
same mechanisms that are already needed within the
clause. In particular, we have invoked the notion of
anaphoric presupposition (Van der Sandt, 1992) to
explain how various discourse connectives get their
interpretation. Since these presuppositions are li-
censed by eventualities taken to be shared know-
ledge, a good source of which is the interpretation
of the discourse so far, anaphoric presupposition can
be seen as carrying some of the burden of discourse
connectivity and discourse semantics, in a way that
avoids crossing dependencies.
There is, potentially, another benefit to factor-
ing the sources of discourse semantics in this way:
while cross-linguistically, inference and anaphoric
presupposition are likely to behave similarly, struc-
ture (as in syntax) is likely to be more language spe-
cific. Thus a factored approach has a better chance
of providing a cross-linguistic account of discourse
than one that relies on a single premise.
We believe that systematic study, perhaps starting
with the 350 “cue phrases” given in (Knott, 1996,
Appendix A), will show which of them use presup-
position in realising discourse relations. It is likely
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that these might include:
 temporal conjunctions and adverbial connect-
ives such as “when”, “then”, “later”, “mean-
while”, “afterwards”, “beforehand”’;
 adverbial connectives presupposing shared
knowledge of a set, such as “for example”,
“first...second...”, “for instance”;
 adverbial connectives presupposing shared
knowledge of an abstraction, such as “more
specifically”, “in particular”;
 adverbial connectives presupposing a comple-
mentary modal context, such as “otherwise”;
 adverbial connectives presupposing an altern-
ative to the current eventuality, such as “in-
stead” and “rather”.4
For this study, one might be able to use the
structure-crossing test given in Section 2 to distin-
guish a relation whose arguments are both given
structurally from a relation which has one of its ar-
guments presupposed. (Such a test won’t distin-
guish p-bearing connectives such as “meanwhile”
from non-relational adverbials such as “at dawn”
and “tonight”. So the latter will have to be excluded
by other means.)
This is one of several directions in which results
are needed. Others include
 achieving a precise semantics for connectives,
as in the work of Grote (1998), Grote et al.
4Gann Bierner, personal communication
(1997), Jayez and Rossari (1998) and Lager-
werf (1998).
 understanding the attentional characteristics
of their presuppositions. In particular, pre-
liminary study seems to suggest that different
p-bearing elements may have different con-
straints on what can license them, where this
source can be located, and what can act as dis-
tractors for such a source. This suggests a cor-
pus annotation effort for (anaphoric) presup-
positions, similar to ones already in progress
on co-reference.
 determining whether the approach has prac-
tical benefit for NL understanding and/or gen-
eration.
But the work to date surely shows the benefit of an
approach that begins the analysis of discourse in the
same syntactic and semantic terms as one does for
the clause.
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